Children's moral judgments about psychological harm: Links among harm salience, victims' vulnerability, and child sympathy.
This study examined 106 5- and 6-year-olds' (M = 5.84 years, SD = 0.62) judgments and justifications about psychological harm (e.g., acts such as teasing or excluding others) assessed in three experimental harm salience conditions (highly salient harm, less salient harm, and no harm) crossed with two victims' vulnerability conditions (typical child and vulnerable child). We also examined interactions between these features and parent and child ratings of sympathy. Children evaluated highly salient harm as more unacceptable, more punishable, and more wrong independent of authority and as resulting in victims' more negative emotions than less salient harm and, in turn, no harm. Children reasoned about others' welfare most for highly salient harm stories, whereas children reasoned about less salient harm stories as involving moral and non-moral concerns. In considering victims' vulnerability, children evaluated harm done to typical victims as more wrong than harm done to vulnerable victims. Higher levels of child-reported sympathy were associated with ratings of transgressions as more unacceptable and wrong independent of authority, but only for less salient harm stories. The results demonstrate children's ability to incorporate different features of psychological harm into their moral judgments and highlight the importance of child sympathy in their understanding of more nuanced forms of harm.